France lifts the veil on “Poker” to harden airborne nuclear deterrence

Key facts

• Operation “Poker” is conducted four times a year and involves about 50 French aircraft rehearsing an airborne nuclear strike.
• France simulates ASMPA-R cruise-missile launches during Poker and debriefs outcomes, including expected attrition against modern air defences.
• France plans to reopen the Luxeuil nuclear air base; by 2035 it should host Rafale F5 jets equipped with the ASN4G hypersonic nuclear cruise missile.

3 minute read

France is increasingly willing to discuss elements of its nuclear strike rehearsal cycle in a calculated shift from traditional opacity toward more explicit strategic signalling. Operation “Poker”, conducted four times per year and involving around 50 aircraft, rehearses the airborne leg of France’s nuclear deterrent, with crews simulating launches of the ASMPA-R air-launched nuclear cruise missile and assessing the losses expected when attempting to penetrate an adversary’s air-defence network. Gen. Stéphane Virem, who commands the air force’s nuclear arm, frames the central task as guaranteeing the ability to break through modern detection and engagement systems—radars, surface-to-air missiles, satellites and evolving air-defence concepts—whose pace of improvement, he argues, has accelerated markedly compared with a decade ago.

Ukraine and the Middle East are explicitly shaping French assumptions about high-intensity air operations in a “degraded environment”, including chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear conditions and attacks on national territory. Virem highlights rapid innovation cycles in drones and counter-drone measures, the growing premium on longer-range air-to-air missiles, suppression of enemy air defences, and the integration of collaborative combat drones—an implicit acknowledgement that traditional strike packages must adapt to dense, sensor-rich battlespaces and the attrition dynamics now visible on Europe’s eastern flank.

Politically, the reporting situates this more visible posture in a wider European debate: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and repeated nuclear signalling, combined with anxieties about the durability of US security guarantees, elevate the salience of France’s independent deterrent. Paris continues to stress that France’s “vital interests” have a European dimension while retaining deliberate ambiguity over nuclear thresholds. Macron has initiated discussions with partners including Germany, Sweden, Finland and Poland on nuclear cooperation, with the prospect—raised in the source—of their participation in Poker in the future. That would represent a significant shift in European nuclear consultation practices even short of formal “nuclear sharing”.

Modernisation underpins the signalling. France is pursuing updates to both airborne and seaborne deterrent forces, with a 2027 budget proposal of €63.4 billion in military spending and around 12% earmarked for nuclear deterrence. Macron has announced the reopening of a fourth nuclear air base at Luxeuil near the German border; by 2035 it is slated to host Rafale F5 squadrons equipped with ASN4G, France’s future nuclear-armed hypersonic cruise missile. In parallel, Virem flags force-structure strain: an eventual requirement for 230 combat aircraft versus roughly 185 today, as nuclear-capable Rafales are also in demand for conventional missions—an issue with direct implications for European airpower availability in a major contingency.

For European officials and industry, the operational lesson is that France is treating penetrative strike as a contested, rapidly evolving problem set—one where drones, SEAD/DEAD, space-based sensing and high-end survivability drive procurement. The strategic lesson is that Paris is betting that selective transparency—alongside “strategic ambiguity” on warhead numbers—can strengthen deterrence credibility vis-à-vis Moscow while simultaneously creating political space for closer European alignment around France’s force de frappe, though domestic politics (including the next presidential election) could reshape the terms of any such cooperation.

Source: POLITICO Europe