Germany’s loyal-wingman plan slips as ministry splits over MQ-28 vs EU options

German ministry infighting over an MQ-28 Ghost Bat bridge buy versus a Europe-first competition is pushing Berlin’s 2029 combat-drone milestone out of reach.

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A NATO flag flying outside NATO headquarters in Brussels, symbolizing alliance capability requirements.
A NATO flag flying outside NATO headquarters in Brussels, symbolizing alliance capability requirements.

Key facts

  • NATO expects Germany to provide a reusable jet-powered uncrewed combat aircraft capability by 2035; Berlin aimed to field an initial fleet by 2029.
  • Ministry papers cited by POLITICO show a split between buying 12 MQ-28 Ghost Bat aircraft as a bridge or running a competition first; a planning memo says the 2029 target is no longer achievable.
  • Initial fleet cost is cited at ~€820 million; concerns include platform modification risk, mission-software control, and limited German/EU industrial workshare requiring Bundestag approval.

3 minute read

Germany’s effort to acquire a reusable, jet-powered uncrewed combat aircraft capability—a NATO-relevant “collaborative combat aircraft/loyal wingman” class system—has become a test case for Europe’s broader tension between urgent fielding and industrial sovereignty. POLITICO reports that the Luftwaffe currently lacks such a capability, even as NATO expects Berlin to deliver it by 2035. Germany’s internal ambition to field an initial fleet by 2029 to accumulate operational experience now appears to be slipping, with a planning memo prepared for State Secretary for Arms Jens Plötner reportedly concluding the 2029 goal can no longer be met and recommending postponement.

At issue is whether Berlin should buy Boeing Australia’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat as an interim “bridge” capability or delay commitment in order to run a competition first that gives German and European-led designs more time to mature. The earlier concept—backed by parts of the ministry’s innovation staff—envisaged purchasing 12 MQ-28 aircraft while also testing rival offerings, with Rheinmetall involved in studying adaptation and partial production in Germany. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius publicly acknowledged the MQ-28 option during a March visit to Australia, signalling political openness to an accelerated foreign purchase.

A ministry assessment cited by POLITICO found that none of the available aircraft fully meets Germany’s requirement set. The MQ-28 would need modifications to support the ground-attack mission Germany wants, and the head of the procurement agency questioned whether those changes could be delivered by 2029. Meanwhile, German- and European-led alternatives were assessed as insufficiently mature. The indicative cost for the initial fleet is put at roughly €820 million, with a significant share of industrial work likely outside Germany—an obstacle in Berlin, where Bundestag budget committee approval is required and lawmakers are increasingly pressing for spending that strengthens German and European industrial capacity and retains sensitive technologies.

The latest planning recommendation reportedly reverses sequencing: run the competition first, then select and adapt a platform, accepting that fielding by 2029 becomes unattainable because the competition would not begin until 2027. The rationale is to reduce the risk of investing in a heavily modified interim platform and to improve prospects for European entrants while preserving control over mission software—an issue with direct implications for European autonomy in high-end air combat and electronic warfare. As a partial stopgap, officials proposed relying in part on cruise missiles from 2027, though these do not replicate the reusability or mission flexibility of uncrewed combat aircraft.

For Europe, the German decision matters beyond national capability: it will shape demand signals for EU industrial teams, timelines for integrating uncrewed systems with Eurofighter/F-35 fleets, and whether a major European air power chooses a non-European bridging platform in a domain increasingly defined by software, mission systems and network integration. The immediate risk is a training and doctrine gap in the late 2020s; the strategic risk is that delay compresses the timeline to meet NATO’s 2035 requirement and could force a larger, less sovereign procurement later.

Source: POLITICO Europe