If Czech Combat Jets Go to Ukraine to Hunt Shahed Drones, Which Could Be Sent?
Czech L‑159 light attack jets and Saab Gripen fighters are the most likely aircraft that could be transferred to Ukraine to engage Shahed loitering munitions, but operational, technical and political constraints limit their effectiveness.
Key facts
- Most likely Czech candidates: Aero L‑159 ALCA (light‑attack) or Saab JAS 39 Gripen (multi‑role).
- Fast jets face technical limits against low‑RCS, slow Shahed loitering munitions; guns/jettisoned ordnance often required.
- Layered C‑UAS, electronic warfare and ground AD are typically more efficient and scalable solutions.
2 minute read
Debate has arisen over whether Prague could transfer combat aircraft to Ukraine specifically to counter Iran‑origin Shahed loitering munitions. The most realistic Czech types are the Aero L‑159 ALCA light‑attack jets and the Saab JAS 39 Gripen multi‑role fighters (the latter operated under lease in recent years and set for replacement). Each presents trade‑offs: L‑159s are suited for low‑altitude, close‑in tasks and are more expendable; Gripens offer superior sensors, datalinks and modern missiles but are fewer and politically sensitive.
Technically, Shahed‑type loitering munitions pose detection and engagement challenges. Their low radar cross‑section, slow speed and ability to loiter at low altitude complicate missile seeker acquisition and radar tracking—conditions in which fast jets and high‑speed air‑to‑air missiles are not optimally employed. Engagements may therefore require close‑range gun attacks or unguided ordnance, increasing risk to pilots, aircraft and civilians.
Practical factors also matter: pilot training, spares, maintenance, basing and sustainment would be needed before Czech aircraft could operate effectively in Ukraine. Politically, sending modern fighters would require domestic approval, and NATO/EU coordination, and carries escalation risks.
From a European defence perspective, layered countermeasures—short‑range ground air‑defence, dedicated C‑UAS systems, and electronic‑warfare/jamming—are generally more efficient for bluntly limiting Shahed strikes. If aircraft are transferred, L‑159s are the likeliest candidates for direct counter‑drone work; Gripens could add broader air‑defence capability but are less tailored to the Shahed threat and costlier to commit.
Source: Defense Express
