KNDS pushes EU to let arms plants down hostile drones amid hybrid threat wave

Key facts

• KNDS urges changes to national laws so defense firms can neutralise suspicious drones over their own sites.
• Politico links the push to a wider wave of arson, sabotage and espionage incidents targeting European arms producers, several attributed by capitals to Russia.
• KNDS calls for EU-level coordination: a Commission task force to stress-test defense industry resilience, better intelligence access for industry, and EU budget support for protective measures.

3 minute read

KNDS, the Franco-German manufacturer behind systems including Leopard 2 tanks and Caesar self-propelled howitzers, is pressing European governments to change legal frameworks so defense companies can directly defeat suspicious drones over their plants. The firm’s position is that the current model in many European countries—restricting counter-drone operations to law enforcement and the armed forces—introduces fatal delays, particularly against first-person-view (FPV) and other small UAS that can evade or exploit gaps in layered air defence. KNDS Executive Vice President Marcel Grisnigt argues that, today, industry can typically do little more than alert local authorities, by which point an overflight may already have delivered imagery, mapped security procedures, or enabled a kinetic or incendiary effect.

The push comes amid a broader pattern of hostile activity and investigations around European defense production, increasingly framed by capitals as Russian-linked hybrid pressure on Ukraine’s supporters. Politico reports Estonia accusing Russian intelligence of ordering an arson attack against Milrem Robotics, and multiple European states examining suspicious incidents at arms plants. The article also cites a warning from Russia’s foreign ministry spokesperson that facilities outside Ukraine producing weapons for Kyiv should not be assumed safe, reinforcing the deterrence-by-disruption logic that European industry fears.

Operationally, KNDS highlights two families of counter-UAS effects: non-kinetic measures that disrupt command links to force landing or departure, and kinetic options that physically bring drones down. The policy fault line is who is authorised to employ these effects over industrial sites. Grisnigt praises France’s approach under its newly adopted military planning law, which allows weapons manufacturers and other critical infrastructure operators to use counter-drone systems on their own sites; he contrasts this with Germany, where he says defense companies are not permitted to do so.

Strategically, KNDS is seeking European-level coordination to match a cross-border threat. It wants the defense industrial base treated more like critical infrastructure under EU rules, including improved access to threat intelligence and a more consistent protection framework. KNDS is calling for the European Commission to urgently create a task force to “stress-test” defense industry resilience against hybrid threats, and proposes that protective measures be eligible for funding from the EU’s next long-term budget via the European Competitiveness Fund to avoid purely national cost burdens. The company has begun canvassing other European arms makers and intends to raise the issue with EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius.

For European procurement officials and primes, the implication is immediate: without delegated authorities and pre-cleared rules of engagement for on-site counter-UAS, security dependencies on local responders risk becoming a single point of failure for surge production targets and 2030 readiness plans. The emerging French model may become a de facto benchmark, putting pressure on Germany and other states to harmonise authorisations, liability regimes, spectrum/jamming permissions, and intelligence-sharing channels with vetted industrial security teams.

Source: Politico.eu