Netherlands Joins US Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft Program
The Netherlands has signed a letter of intent to participate in the U.S. Air Force’s collaborative combat aircraft program, enhancing its F-35 fleet. This partnership aims to strengthen transatlantic defense ties and address security threats amid rising drone activity in Europe.
Key facts
- The Netherlands signed a letter of intent with the U.S. Air Force for a combat aircraft program.
- A separate agreement with General Atomics aims to enhance drone technology in the Netherlands.
- The partnership seeks to address security threats from Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine.
- Dutch officials emphasize the need for balanced manned and unmanned defense systems.
2 minute read
The Dutch decision to join the US Air Force's collaborative combat aircraft effort is a pragmatic pivot for Europe, trading bespoke timelines for near term mass and interoperability. Pairing uncrewed teammates with the F-35 promises faster fielding of sensing, electronic warfare and strike capacity across NATO.
Strategically, this binds Dutch air doctrine to a US led stack for autonomy, data links and command and control. Common architectures should reduce integration friction among F-35 users and accelerate tactics for manned unmanned teaming. The trade off is tighter dependence on US software, certification and configuration control.
The General Atomics arrangement is an industrial hedge and capability on ramp. It builds on Dutch MQ-9 experience to expand ISR, training and sustainment, while providing testbeds for sensors, autonomy and maintenance at scale. That can anchor local skills and supply chains without duplicating high risk development programs.
Operationally, NATO gains depth against Russian air defenses and the drone dense battlespace shaped by Ukraine. Attritable platforms that scout, jam and strike from range raise survivability for manned jets and complicate targeting. Real effect hinges on shared mission data, weapon compatibility and coalition targeting processes that work under fire.
Execution risk is nontrivial. Crowded European airspace, contested spectrum and persistent electronic attack demand robust LPI LPD links, cyber hardening and assured navigation. Airspace procedures, spectrum governance and training must evolve together so swarming and loyal wingman concepts can safely operate from European bases at scale.
Policy and budgets will decide outcomes. Clear rules on data rights, software updates and export controls are needed to enable European industry participation and avoid lock in to closed interfaces. Investment must prioritize autonomy maturation, counter UAS and munitions stockpiles, not only platforms, to generate credible combat power quickly.
Europe is converging on networked, teamed and attritable airpower built for resilient mass.
